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RECENT CASES
pass upon the validity of zoning ordinances,1
8 provided an actual controversy
cxists.11 Sufficient controversy has been found in threatened non-compliance
with a penal statute.20 However, in the instant case, there was no justiciable
controversy within either the strict or liberal view set forth above. The dis-
puted enactment violated no apparent right of the petitioner, either present
or prospective. Not only had the plaintiff failed to violate the ordinance,
but it also apparently had decided to forego any future sign building,
since it had allowed the electric company to string wires before the eminent
domain proceedings. The petitioner's real dispute was with the electric
company, not the municipality that enacted the ordinance. It seems that
the granting of the judgment in this case would have constituted a flagrant
misuse of the declaratory judgment remedy.
Although the remedy under consideration should be flexible, it does not
encompass the granting of purely advisory opinions.2 1 If any individual could
demand judicial determination of validity of any legislative enactment, the gov-
ernment unit involved would be forced into an unlimited number of costiy
defense actions, and the benefits derived from such actions would probably
be negligible. Such an extension of this invaluable remedy would also admit
to litigation a burdensome number of speculative disputes which may never
become ripe for judicial determination and should not be permitted to con-
sume the time of our courts.
GEORGE DYNES
OIL AND GAS - LEASES AND ASSIGNMENTS - INTEREST CREATED THEREBY. -
On appeal of an action for damages for breach of an oral agreement by de-
fendant to accept from plaintiff assignments of oil and gas leases it was held,
that oil, gas and mineral leases are transfers of interests in real property
within the terms of the Statute of Frauds.Petroleum Exchange Inc. v. Poynter,
64 N.W. 2d 718 (N.D. 1954).
The nature of an oil and gas leasehold interest is a problem which has
plagued the courts of oil-producing states. It has been termed a personal
right,' a corporeal hereditament,2 an incorporeal hereditament,3 a servitude,
4
-nd a chattel real.5 Although a definition of a legal concept may not seem
overly important, once a concept is defined, certain aggregates of legal rela-
tionships result. Problems involving the nature of available remedies," taxa-
18. Andrews v. City of Piedmont, 100 Cal. App. 700, 281 Pac. 78 (1929); West
v. City of Witchita, 118 Kans. 265, 234 Pac. 978 (1925). See Borchard, op. cit. supra
note 1 at 764.
19. Taylor v. Haverford Tp., 299 Pa. 402, 149 Atl. 639 (1930).
20. Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. City of New York, 247 App. Div. 163, 287 N.Y.S.
288 (1936). contra: City of Nashville v. Snow, 204 Ga. 371, 49 S.E.2d 808 (1948).
21. See note 5 supra.
1. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Glassell, 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936).
2. Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338, 74 Atl. 207 (1909).
3. Lake v. Sealy, 231 Ala. 446, 165 So. 399 (1936); Robinson v. Smalley, 102 Kan.
842, 171 Pac. 1155 (1918);, Denver Land Bank v. Dixon, 57 Wyo. 523, 122 P.2d
842 (1942).
4. Nabors Oil & Gas Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1920).
Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sallings's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1920).
5. Richardson v. Callahan, 213 Cal. 683, 3 P.2d 927 (1931).
6. E.g., Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101 (1915).
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tion,7 the validity of mechanic's liens of the lesee's interest,t and homestead
acts0 may all ultimately turn on such a classification.
Most courts originally held that like animals ferae naturae, oil and gas,
because of their fugacious character, could not be the subject of absolute
ownership until reduced to possession.10 However, because one had a right
to reduce them to possession and control, there is a qualified ownership,
sometimes called a property right," a corporeal hereditament,1- or incorporeal
hereditament.'-' Even where it is conceded that one cannot own oil and gas
in the ground, and that they could not actually be the subject of a grant,
14
one can convey a right of entry for the purposes of prospecting, laying pipes
and drilling. This in effect amounts to a conveyance in the land itself, which
if indefinite in duration would be a freehold. 15 Thus, limited by their original
position, these courts have been forced to the conclusion that at best, oil and
gas in place can be subject only to a "qualified ownership".1" What interest
then, does a lease of this right convey?
Pennsylvania holds generally that although ownership of oil and gas is
not absolute until reduction to possession, the interest created by the lease
may carry with it the right of cjectment; of course, the lease may
also be a mere license or grant of an incorporeal hereditament, depending
upon the wording of the granting clause.17 California has classified the lease
as a profit a prendre in the nature of a freehold or determinable fee if capable
of infinite duration, or a "chattel real" if limited to a fixed terms of years.ls
This definition has been criticized on the ground that an estate cannot be a
presently vested posessory interest and at the same time a profit a prendre
which is usually classed as a non-possessory incorporeal interest in land.19
Oklahoma, like California, holds that a lease creates a presently vested interest
in the land of another in the forn of an incorporeal interest or profit a
prendre.20 The decisions, however, indicate that there has been some Con-
7. E.g., Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmersons, 298 111. 394, 131 N.E. 645 (1921);
Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Oliver County, 38 N.D. 57, 164 N.W. 315 (1917);
Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923).
8. E.g., Stark v. Petty Bros., 195 Ky. 445, 243 S.W. 50 (1922).
9. E.g., Dixon v. Kaufman, 58 N.W.2d 797 (N.D. 1953).
10. E.g., Backer v. Penn Lubricating Co., 162 Fed. 627 (6th Cir. 1908); Fairbanks
v. Warren, 54 Ind. App. 337. 104 N.E. 983 (1914); Frank Oil Co. v. Belleview Gas
& Oil Co., 290 Okla. 719, 119 Pac. 260 (1911); Kolachny v. Galbreath, 26 Okla. 772,
110 Pac. 902 (1910).
11. Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F. 2d 303 (8th Cir. 1943).
12: Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pac. 338, 74 Atl. 207 (1909).
13. See note 3 supra.
14. Poe v. Ulrey, 233 111. 56, 84 N.E. 46 (1908).
15. Greer v. Carter Oil Co., 373 Ill. 168, 25 N.E.2d 805 (1940); Poe v. Ulrey,
233 Ill. 56, 84 N.E. 46 (1908); Blakely v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 34 At. 564 (1896).
16. Fairbanks v. Warren, 54 Ind. App. 337, 104 N.E. 983 (1914). There is no oil or
gas producing state today which follows the wild-animal analogy to its logical conclusion
that the landowner has no property interest in the oil and gas in place". See A. W. Walker,
Jr., Property Rights In Oil and Gas and Their Effect upon Police Regulation of Pro-
duction, 16 Tex. L. Rev. 370, 371 (1938).
17. Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338, 74 At. 207 (1909). In Funk v.
Haldeman, 53 Pa. 229 (1866) it was said that a grant, bargain and sale of the "free
and uninterrupted use, privilege, and liberty to go on any part" of certain described
lands "for the purpose of prospecting, digging, excavating, and boring" . . . together
with a grant of "the right, privilege, and exclusive use of one acre of land at and around
each well or pit" created a license.
18. Schiffman v. Richfield Oil Co. of California, 8 Cal.2d 211, 64 P.2d 1081 (1937);
Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal.2d 110, 43 P.2d 788 (1935); Dabney-Johnston Oil. Corporation
v. Waldon, 4 Cal.2d 637, 52 P.2d 237 (1935).
19. See IA Summers, Oil and Gas 465 (Penn. ed. 1954).
20. Rich v. Doneghy, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86 (1918).
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fusion in applying such a classification.-' Texas has held that oil and gas
can be owned absolutely,2- and that a lease may create a determinable fee.22
Evidently a lease for some purposes is treated as real property2 4 and for
others as personal property.2 "No rule applicable in all cases can be es-
tablished."' 6 A prominent writer has said: "Perhaps some time courts and
legislatures will recognize the fact that oil and gas leases are different from
other forms of contracts and conveyances and that the interest created by
them cannot be properly classified under common interests in property, and
will speak of such interest as the interest of an oil and gas lessee, as most
of them now speak of a mortgagee's interest after centuries of trying to call
it something else."
' '
The courts have found that under any theory, further defining of legal
incidents has been necessary because of the peculiar characteristics of oil and
gas. 28 While they recognize the "rule of capture," i.e., ownership results from
reduction to possession, 29 the courts have also observed what is known as
the "correlative" rights theory.0 Thus, each owner's privilege to drain the
oil is limited by the duty not to waste or take in undue amounts so as to
injure the common source of supply and thus prevent other landowners from
taking their shares.31
The few pertinent North Dakota cases are of little help in determining the
theory of ownership, if any, which has been adopted and what type of in-
terest a lease creates. It has been held that a reservation in a deed of "all
minerals" creates an interest-in land for purposes of taxation. ' 2 Another case
has held that a reservation of the minerals by deed creates a freehold estate. 33
Neither case, however, was directly concerned with oil and gas. In a later
case, in which oil and gas were specifically mentioned in the mineral reserva-
tion clause, the court indicated that oil and gas in place can be subject to
ownership.
. 4
On the basis of these decisions it might be argued that oil and gas can
be owned absolutely, in North Dakota, as in Texas, and that a lease or graAt
could create a fee simple estate. This, of course, is strictly conjecture, since
the court has had an opportunity to attempt a classification of the interest
21. See Ewert v. Robinson, 289 Fed. 740 (8th Cir. 1923) (granting clause con-
trolled); First National Bank of Healdton v. Dunlop, 122 Okla. 228, 254 Pac. 729
(1927) (not such an interest as would support a lien of a judgment creditor on "real
estate"); Carter Oil Co. v. Popp, 70 Okla. 232, 174 Pac. 747 (1918) (required 'oint
consent of husband and wife to release homestead interest in oil and gas).
22. Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290
(1923).
23. See note 22 supra. See also IA Summers, Oil and Gas 440 (Perm. ed. 1954).
24. Robinson v. Smalley, 102 Kan. 842, 171 Pac. 1155 (1919) (lease must be in
writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds); White v. Green, 103 Kan. 405, 173 Pac.
974 (1918) (same).
25. Burden v. Gypsy Oil Co., 141 Kan. 147, 40 P.2d 463 (1935).
26. Ewert v. Robinson, supra note 21 at 747.
27. 1A Summers, Oil and Gas 382 (Penn. ed. 1954).
28. See 1 Summers, Oil & Gas § 63 (Perm. ed. 1954).
29. Gruger v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 192 Okla. 259, 135 P.2d 485 (1943)."
30. Ohio Oil Co., v. State of Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900); Manufacturer's Gas
& Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Ghs & Oil Co., 155 Ind. 461, 57 N.E. 912 (1900).
31. See note 30 supra.
32. Northwestern Improvement Company v. Oliver County, 38 N.D. 57, 164 N.W.
315 (1917).
33. Beulah Coal Mining Co. v. Heihns, 46 N.D. 646, 180 N.W. 787 (1920).
34. State of North Dakota v. Northwestern Improvement Company, 72 N.D. 393,
7 N.W.2d 724 (1943); See also Northwestern Improvement Company v. State of North
Dakota, 57 N.D. 1, 220 N.W. 436 (1928).
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and has not done so.35 Were the legislature to specifically deal with the
problems of how an oil and gas lease should be treated, for example with
regard to homestead and taxation, solutions might be affected. This course
would relieve the courts of the burden of formulating and defining the various
rights and duties of parties involved, and at the same time reduce consider-
ably the possibility of litigation in this area.
GERRY GLASER
TAXATION - FEDERAL INCOME TAX - DOES THE SALE OF CULLS FROM A
BREEDING HERD PRODUCE CAPITAL GAIN? - It was the practice of the plaintiff,
a raiser of purebred Guernsey cattle for breeding purposes, to cull as rapidly
as possible from his herd those animals which did not measure up to its
high standards. In 1946 a number of these culls were sold by the plaintiff.
The proceeds from the sale of the animals held over six months were Teported
as a capital gain. The Collector of Internal Revenue contended that capital
gains treatment could be applied only to those animals held over twenty four
months, and notified the plaintiff of the deficiency. Plaintiff paid the deficiency
and sued for a refund. Plaintiff argued that his purpose in raising and pur-
chasing the calves was to introduce them into his breeding herd, and the
sale of animals culled was only incidental to his business. On appeal the court
held, that the animals were held for breeding purposes and therefore were
held for "use in the taxpayer's trade or business" rather than "primarily for
sale", and consequently were subject to capital gains treatment within Section
117 (j) of the Internal Revenue Code. McDONALD V. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, 214 F. 2d 341 (2d Cir. 1954).
The fact that livestock may constitute property held for use in a trade or
business, and thus a capital asset, was first recognized by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue in 1944.' However, he qualified this position by de-
claring that the sale of animals as slaughter or feeder cattle culled from a
herd held for draft, dairy or breeding purposes did not constitute a sale of
capital assets. 2 In a bulletin issued in 19453 this position was altered to the
extent that capital gains treatment would be allowed for the sale of culls if
the animals sold exceeded the number of replacements thus reducing the
size of the dairy or breeding herd. In 1948, however, the case of Albright v.
United StateS4 held that the receipts from the sale of cows which did not
decrease the size of the dairy herd, could receive capital gains treatment,
because they satisfied the statutory definition of a capital asset applicable at
that time Many courts followed this precedent. 5 The result was a substantial
departure from the viewpoint formerly expressed by the Commissioner. In
1951, he conceded that the sale of animals culled from a herd held for draft,
35. In Ulrich v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation, 66 N.W.2d 397 (N.D. 1954) the
court cited the instant case with approval but did not attempt to define the interest any
further.
1. I. T. 3666, 1944-1 Cum. Bull. 270.
2. 56 Star. 846 (1942), 26 U. S. C. J 117 (j) (1946).
3. I. T. 3712, 1945-1 Cu. Bull. 176.
4. 173 F. 2d 339 (8th Cir. 1949). The Court held that the sale of culls from a
dairy herd is only incidental to the raising of the dairy herd and is required for the suc-
cessful operation and management of the herd.
5. United States v. Bennett, 186 F. 2d. 407 (5th Cir. 1951); Colvert v. United
States, 101 F. Supp. 673 (D. Nebr. 1951); Laflin v. United States, 100 F. Su*p. 353 (D.
Nebr. 1951); Miller v. United States, 98 F. Supp, 948 (D. Nebr. 1951); letz v. Bir-
mingham, 98 F. Supp. 322 (D. Iowa 1951).
